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Abstract 
How does offshoring affect individual party preferences in multi-party systems? We argue 
that exposure to offshoring influences individual preferences for those political parties with 
clear policy positions on issues relevant for individuals with offshorable jobs (left, liberal and 
center-right parties), but does not affect voting decisions for parties concentrating on other 
issues (green parties or populist right parties). Examining individual-level data from five 
waves of the European Social Survey for 18 advanced democracies, we find that these effects 
vary by skill-level and exposure. Offshoring increases preferences for liberal and center-right 
parties that advocate economic openness among the highly skilled. In contrast, low-skilled 
individuals exposed to offshoring are more likely to prefer leftist political parties that 
champion social protection and redistribution. Furthermore, offshoring does not affect the 
propensity to vote for green and populist right parties. 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
We would like to thank Jim Alt, Michael Bechtel, Matthew Bergman, Christian Breunig, 
Brian Burgoon, Daniele Caramani, Irene Menendez, Liz Zechmeister, participants in seminars 
at UC San Diego, the University of Konstanz, and the University of Zurich as well as the 
three anonymous reviewers and the editors at Comparative Political Studies for helpful 
comments and suggestions. We are especially grateful to Linda Maduz, who helped us push 
this project forward in its early stages.   
 2 
1. Introduction 
 
In the wake of the recent successes of populist parties and candidates in the Western 
world, a prominent narrative has been that these achievements reflect the deep dissatisfaction 
of the losers of globalization. Who these losers are, how their dissatisfaction translates into 
political decisions, and how established parties are affected by globalization remains opaque, 
however. This paper contributes to unpacking the mechanisms linking globalization and 
voting behavior. It focuses on one specific aspect of globalization that has accelerated rapidly 
over the last decades: Offshoring – the migration of employment from one country to other 
countries (Blinder 2009). 
The enormous technological advances of recent decades have increasingly enabled 
firms to not just trade internationally, but to move production activities abroad. This 
phenomenon has confronted domestic workers not only with competition from foreign firms, 
but also within their own firms. Importantly, offshoring not only affects low-skilled 
employees of manufacturing firms, which build factories in countries with low labor and 
production costs, but is a phenomenon that nowadays affects many service sector employees 
as well (Head et al., 2009; Jensen & Kletzer, 2010). Call center assistance, accounting 
services, or IT support are increasingly provided by individuals located in foreign countries. 
As a result, many white-collar workers that traditionally have been sheltered from 
international competition have suddenly become exposed to global competition – a trend that 
is likely to intensify in the future (Blinder, 2006; Crinò, 2009). The number of workers 
directly affected by offshoring has indeed grown considerably in recent years, and offshoring 
has become a contentious and highly politicized issue in the public debate about globalization 
(Mankiw & Swagel, 2006; Owen, forthcoming). Some observers query whether offshoring is 
the “next industrial revolution” (Blinder, 2006: 113) threatening “virtually the entire 
employed middle class” (Luttwak, 1995: 7) or suggest that it poses “a greater threat than 
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terrorism” (Roberts, 2014: 1), although others are more cautious, suggesting that offshoring 
“is not the tsunami that many claim” (Drezner, 2004: 29). 
Surprisingly, we know comparatively little about the political consequences of this 
development, especially in the non-US context. Several studies show that offshoring affects 
individuals’ policy preferences (Chase, 2008; Owen & Johnston, forthcoming; Walter, 2017). 
How exactly these preferences are translated into politically meaningful actions such as the 
vote is less clear, however. Existing work relies solely on single country studies such as 
Switzerland (Walter, 2010) and the US (Jensen et al., forthcoming; Margalit, 2011; Mughan 
& Lacy, 2002). Although insightful, these cases are not comparable to the bulk of developed 
democracies: Switzerland is a consensus democracy, where all large parties are always part of 
the government. And with its presidential political system, the dominance of two parties, and 
the very polarized political landscape, electoral politics in the US exhibits very different 
dynamics than in multi-party systems. Moreover, existing research focuses either on the vote 
for one specific party family, or concentrates on the vote for the incumbent party.  
In most modern democracies, voters have a choice between a broad range of political 
parties who pursue very different policy agendas in response to globalization (Burgoon, 2012; 
Garrett, 1998; Haupt, 2010; Kriesi et al., 2008; Swank, 2002). In order to understand how 
globalization affects partisan politics and national policymaking in multi-party democracies, 
however, it is important to understand how the objective individual-level risks and 
opportunities translate into voting behavior. Examining whether offshoring is a salient issue 
for voters’ electoral decisions at all, for which political parties offshoring is likely to matter 
most, and how it affects the electoral success of populist parties in a comparative perspective 
therefore improves our understanding of the link between globalization and partisan politics.  
This paper provides such an analysis. Building on the insight that the effects of 
offshoring vary significantly among citizens, we argue that offshoring represents a relevant 
issue for some political parties, whereas its saliency for other political parties is low. Because 
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highly skilled individuals tend to benefit from the opportunities of offshoring, they are more 
likely to support parties that advocate economic openness and international competition, 
especially liberal and center-right parties. In contrast, low-skilled individuals with easily 
offshorable jobs are threatened by the globalization of production and are therefore expected 
to vote for parties that promise protection and compensation. Offshoring is hence important 
for those political party families with clear policy positions relevant for individuals exposed 
to offshoring, i.e. left, liberal and center-right parties. In contrast, the risks associated with 
offshoring are a much less salient issue for political parties who concentrate more on cultural 
and ideational issues, such as post-material issues in the case of green parties. Moreover, 
contrary to the widely held belief that globalization losers flock to populist parties across the 
board, we argue that this depends on the type of a voter’s globalization exposure: Offshoring 
exposure does not strongly affect the vote for populist right parties that focus predominantly 
on another dimension of globalization, especially immigration. 
Empirically, this paper utilizes cross-national survey data from 18 advanced West 
European countries over the period from 2002 to 2010 to examine how offshoring affects 
individual preferences for partisan policy positions and party families. Our results show that 
exposure to offshoring-induced risks and opportunities has significant effects on electoral 
behavior: Low-skilled individuals working in offshorable occupations are more likely to vote 
for compensatory policies put forward by left parties than low-skilled individuals working in 
sheltered occupations. In contrast, individuals in offshorable occupations are more likely to 
vote for parties advocating economic competition and openness, especially liberal and center-
right parties, if they are highly skilled. At the same time, offshoring risks and opportunities 
play a minor role for the electoral support of populist right and green parties. Our findings 
thus support the notion that the effects of globalization on partisan politics are heterogeneous, 
affecting some political parties and party families more strongly than others. This implies that 
some political parties are more pressured than others in trying to reconcile their constituents’ 
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policy demands with the demands of special interests and global competitive pressures 
emanating from general trends of globalization. 
 
 
2. Offshoring and the Vote 
 
How does offshoring affect partisan politics? We focus on electoral politics as a 
particularly salient arena of party competition and examine how offshoring affects 
individuals’ voting behavior. Building on the insight that the heterogeneous individual-level 
effects of offshoring create both winners and losers, we discuss how these distributional 
consequences influence policy preferences and, in turn, voting behavior. In a final step, we 
discuss how the effect of offshoring on vote choice differs among party families. 
 
2.1. Risks and Opportunities of Offshoring 
The jobs most at risk from offshoring in developed countries are routine jobs that can 
easily be provided from anywhere in the world. But even non-routine jobs in the service 
sector that do not require face-to-face interactions are nowadays more and more likely to be 
moved abroad (Acemoglu & Autor, 2011). As the scope of offshoring has grown, public 
commentary has increasingly focused on the downside risks of offshoring. In line with this 
concern, existing scientific studies tend to assume that offshoring has a uniform negative 
effect on all workers in offshorable occupations (Mansfield & Mutz, 2013; Margalit, 2011; 
Owen, forthcoming; Scheve & Slaughter, 2004).  
It seems intuitive that offshoring poses a substantial threat to workers whose job tasks 
can theoretically be performed abroad. But offshoring carries not only risks, but also brings 
opportunities (Feenstra & Hanson, 1996). Some jobs are offshored, meaning that their tasks 
are now performed abroad and that these jobs are lost to domestic workers. At the same time, 
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other jobs are onshored, meaning that domestic workers perform tasks for use abroad. 
Although the phenomenon of offshoring is often thought of in terms of the migration of jobs 
from rich to poor countries, individuals in rich countries thus often also provide services for 
firms located in other rich countries or even poor countries. For example, some firms with 
headquarters in less developed economies have built up research centers in advanced 
economies and hire local engineers. 
This suggests that offshoring has considerable distributive effects that vary across 
different groups of workers. A considerable number of people working in jobs most likely to 
be offshored face increasing difficulties of finding a new job in the same occupation and their 
wages are likely to be depressed the more widespread offshoring becomes (Feenstra & 
Hanson, 1999; Hummels et al., 2014). Typically, these are low-skilled workers, who perform 
routine tasks, which can be more cheaply provided from abroad (Owen & Johnston, 
forthcoming). Low-skilled workers in offshorable occupations may even experience 
downward pressure on their wages when their jobs are not actually offshored, because 
offshoring increases the supply of workers in their occupation (Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg, 
2008). Not surprisingly, workers exposed to the negative risks of offshoring have been found 
to report higher levels of labor market risk (Scheve & Slaughter, 2004; Walter, 2017).1  
But offshoring (or in this case, onshoring) also offers opportunities for those workers 
who sell their services to foreign customers. These are usually high-skilled workers who 
perform non-routine tasks.2 As technological change and deregulation increase opportunities 
																																																								
1 We obtain the same result when analyzing the conditional effect of skill and offshorability using our data (see 
table 5 in the online appendix). 
2 Note that these onshoring benefits for high-skilled workers also exist in emerging markets and developing 
countries that have a comparative advantage in producing less skill-intensive goods. Although the jobs of low-
skilled workers are offshored in developed countries, they are onshored in developing countries for the benefit of 
workers who are comparatively highly skilled. As an example, consider that working in a call center in India, 
Kenya, or the Philippines requires workers to be able to read and write well and to speak English, making them 
much more high-skilled relative to the rest of the population than their call-center counterparts in, say, the US. 
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for offshoring, individuals providing such services can sell their skills to a wider set of 
customers worldwide. Research also shows that firms using high-skilled labor in tradable 
goods and services industries create new jobs and pay higher wages (Bernard et al., 2006). 
This improves job security and wages for individuals who possess skills that are competitive 
internationally. The benefits of offshoring thus predominantly accrue to well-educated 
individuals. Not surprisingly, offshoring has been found to increase the wages of high-skilled 
individuals (Hummels et al., 2014) and to be associated with higher levels of labor market 
security among highly skilled individuals in offshorable occupations (Walter, 2010; 2017). 
This discussion should not obscure an important point: despite the accelerating 
offshoring trend, a majority of workers remain unaffected by this new form of global 
competition (Dancygier & Walter, 2015). In fact, many jobs simply cannot be offshored, 
because the services they provide require them to be on-site (Blinder, 2009). Even though 
individuals working in these occupations may be exposed to offshoring indirectly as 
consumers – for example, when calling a call center located in a foreign country – they are 
barely affected as labor market participants. 3  Workers employed in non-offshorable 
occupations are therefore much more sheltered from the globalization of production than 
workers in occupations that provide more impersonal services or general manufactured goods, 
and this applies to both high-skilled and low-skilled workers in sheltered occupations.  
Overall, this suggests that the effects of offshoring vary by an individual’s skill level 
(Walter, 2010; 2017; Owen & Johnston, forthcoming). Offshoring creates the highest labor 
market risks for low-skilled individuals working in offshorable occupations (e.g. assembly-
line workers). Equally low-skilled individuals working in sheltered occupations (e.g. cleaning 
personnel) are better off than their counterparts in offshorable occupations, although they 																																																																																																																																																																													
As a result, we should expect high-skilled workers in offshorable occupations in developing countries and 
emerging markets to benefit from offshoring as well. 
3 There may be some labor-supply effect, but given that job mobility is higher within the same occupation than 
within industries and tends to be limited across occupations, this effect is limited at least in the short-run.  
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continue to experience higher labor market risks than high-skilled workers in sheltered 
occupations (e.g. doctors or teachers). Finally, highly skilled individuals in offshorable 
positions (e.g. engineers or consultants) are the main beneficiaries of the globalization of 
production. This suggests that labor market risks are much more unequally distributed among 
workers exposed to offshoring than among workers in sheltered occupations.4  
 
2.2. Offshoring and Party Preferences 
How do these individual consequences of offshoring translate into voting behavior? 
Much research has shown that individuals support or oppose policies based on the material 
consequences of these policies (e.g., Rehm, 2009; Wren & Rehm, 2013; Scheve & Slaughter, 
2001). With regard to offshoring, this suggests that low-skilled individuals with offshorable 
jobs should have a strong preference for protection from offshoring or, more indirectly, 
protection from these risks through a generous welfare state. In contrast, highly skilled 
individuals, who benefit from offshoring, have a lower need for a state-funded social safety 
net and are also among the main contributors to the financing of the welfare state. Individuals 
sheltered from offshoring should have more moderate policy preferences than their more 
exposed counterparts, with low-skilled individuals demanding more protection than high-
skilled individuals.5 Existing studies on the effects of offshoring on policy preferences 
support these conjectures. For example, individuals working in routine jobs are significantly 																																																								
4 Note that these predictions go against both Heckscher-Ohlin style factoral and Ricardo-Viner style sectoral 
models, but do chime with new developments in economics, such as ‘new new trade theory’ (Helpman et al., 
2004; Melitz, 2003) and ‘trade in tasks’ approaches (Acemoglu & Autor, 2011). In contrast to factoral models, 
offshoring does not hurt all low-skilled workers and benefit all high-skilled workers, but its effect is limited to 
those working in offshorable occupations. In contrast to sectoral models, our argument does not predict industry-
wide but occupation-based effects. ‘New new trade theory’ suggests that the effects of trade are concentrated in 
tradable industries and depend on firm and worker productivity (Helpman et al., 2010), which is correlated with 
skills (Jones, 2001). Finally, the ‘trade in tasks’ literature emphasizes the importance of job tasks and 
occupation-based variation in labor market effects and political preferences (Owen & Johnston, forthcoming). 
5 Besides material considerations, policy support or opposition is of course also driven by many non-material 
considerations (Mansfield & Mutz, 2013).  
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more supportive of protectionism when they work in offshorable occupations than those with 
non-routine jobs (Owen & Johnston, forthcoming). Individuals in jobs most likely to be 
onshored are also much more skeptical of income redistribution than low-skilled individuals 
in offshorable jobs (Wren & Rehm, 2013, Walter 2010; 2017).6  
However, policy preferences can only have an actual impact on the policymaking 
process if they are effectively brought into the political arena. In democratic countries, the 
most straightforward instrument for individuals is their vote for a political party that 
champions the preferred policy in the political process.  
Political parties differ with regard to both the policies they advocate and the saliency 
they put on different policy areas. This is particularly true for political parties in multi-party 
systems, where parties occupy a large range of positions in the political space usually 
demarcated by the traditional left-right (or economic) dimension and a cultural dimension 
(Benoit & Laver, 2006; Kitschelt, 1994; Marks et al., 2006). Offshoring has clearly 
identifiable distributive effects, which predominantly affect preferences for policies located 
on the economic dimension – social and labor market policies, protectionist and market-
liberalizing policies, and fiscal policies. Exposure to offshoring should therefore primarily 
affect individuals’ party preferences for political parties with a distinct and salient position on 
these specific policies and the economic left-right dimension more generally.7 
Parties located at the leftist end of the economic dimension are particularly attractive to 
offshoring losers – low-skilled individuals exposed to offshoring – because these parties 
typically pursue policies that strengthen the welfare state, redistribute income from the rich to 
the poor, and other policies that protect vulnerable workers from labor market risks (Allan & 																																																								
6 Table 5 in the online appendix replicates some of these results for the data used in the analysis below. We show 
that preferences for redistribution are strongest among low-skilled individuals in offshorable occupations and 
least pronounced among high-skilled individuals in offshorable occupations. 
7 Note that in its most general conceptualization, globalization comprising economic, cultural, and political 
attributes is likely to affect partisan politics on both dimensions (Hellwig, 2014; Kriesi et al., 2008). However, 
we focus solely on the globalization of production and, hence, the economic dimension. 
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Scruggs, 2004; Schmidt, 2010). Hence, we expect low-skilled individuals in offshorable 
occupations to exhibit a higher propensity to vote for left parties that advocate generous 
welfare policies. In contrast, the economic and fiscal policies pursued by left parties tend to 
conflict with the material interest of individuals benefitting from offshoring. Higher taxes and 
income redistribution are not only directly paid for by the high-income earners in 
internationally competitive jobs (Wren & Rehm, 2013), but these policies may also hamper 
international competitiveness and hence reduce the economic prospects of these individuals 
(Alesina & Perotti, 1997). As a result, the winners of the offshoring trend are less likely to 
vote for left parties. Notably, we not only expect significant differences in the voting behavior 
of low-and high-skilled workers, but also within each of these groups. Although low-skilled 
voters are more likely to vote for left parties than high-skilled workers more generally, this 
difference should be more pronounced among those working in exposed occupations, because 
the need for protection is particularly high among low-skilled exposed workers and the 
likelihood of paying into a redistributive scheme is particularly high among high-skilled 
exposed workers. Moreover, while left parties tend to push compensating the losers of the 
globalization of production, they also usually embrace the globalization of labor. Among left 
parties, we should thus see a clear difference between the voting preferences of the losers 
from offshoring (low skilled individuals in offshorable jobs) and the losers from immigration 
who typically work in sheltered occupations (Dancygier & Walter 2015). Low-skilled (high-
skilled) individuals in offshorable jobs should therefore be significantly more (less) likely to 
vote for parties advocating leftist policies than low-skilled (high-skilled) individuals whose 
jobs cannot be offshored.  
In contrast, parties located at the rightist end of the state-market-dimension should be 
particularly attractive for high-skilled individuals in offshorable occupations and least 
attractive for low-skilled workers exposed to offshoring risks. As voters with high incomes 
and low labor-market risks, offshoring beneficiaries are not only net payers into the welfare 
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system but also benefit from market-oriented policies, low levels of government spending and 
lower taxes. As a result, they are more likely to vote for parties who pursue market-liberal 
policies, especially liberal and center-right parties. Likewise, these policies run directly 
counter to the policy preferences of offshoring losers, who should therefore be least 
supportive of these parties. Although the parties in these categories differ with regard to their 
position on other policy dimensions (Benoit & Laver, 2006; Schmidt, 2010), they share 
common grounds with regard to economic and social policies. Liberal parties are skeptical 
vis-à-vis state intervention in the economy, actively advocate free market policies including a 
further opening of the economy, and promote lower levels of taxation and a less generous 
provision of social rights (Allan & Scruggs, 2004; Benoit & Laver, 2006; Zohlnhöfer et al., 
2008). Center-right parties tend to be located somewhat more to the center of the left-right 
dimension, but promote free market policies, although some favor embedding these polices in 
a resilient welfare state system, especially Christian democratic parties (van Kersbergen, 
1995). Both liberal and center-right parties therefore carry a strong appeal to high-skilled 
individuals in offshorable occupations, whereas they are least attractive for low-skilled voters, 
especially those in highly offshorable occupations. Again, we expect the effect of skills on 
voting behavior to be weaker among sheltered individuals than among exposed individuals.  
In contrast to party families who clearly position themselves on the state-market 
dimension and for whom social and economic policies are particularly salient, we do not 
expect offshoring to be an important issue for political parties for whom the cultural 
dimension of party competition carries greater importance or whose economic policies do not 
specifically benefit either the winners or the losers of the globalization of production. The two 
most important party families in this regard are populist right parties and green parties.  
Even though previous studies and the popular press have argued that right-wing populist 
parties are particularly appealing to modernization and globalization losers (Betz, 1993; 
Kriesi et al., 2008; for a review, see Bornschier, forthcoming), the effect of offshorability on 
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the propensity to vote for these parties is theoretically ambiguous. For one, these parties focus 
mainly on limiting immigration. This is an important topic on the cultural dimension making 
offshorability-related risks less of a salient issue. Immigration is of course not just a cultural 
issue, but one with strong economic consequences as well, creating risks especially for low-
skilled workers who are most likely to compete with immigrant labor. Low-skilled workers 
are therefore most opposed to immigration (Mayda, 2006), irrespective of whether they work 
in offshorable occupations or not (Dancygier & Walter, 2015). In terms of more classic 
economic policies, these parties tend to de-emphasize the importance of this dimension and to 
deliberately blur their positions (Rovny, 2013). Interestingly, although they often advocate 
‘welfare chauvinist’ policies that limits social protection to nationals only, the overall 
economic policy position of radical and populist right parties tends to be on the market-liberal 
side of the political spectrum (Kitschelt, 2007), with some of these parties explicitly 
supporting free trade (de Lange, 2007). 
For all these reasons, we contend that populist right parties are not particularly attractive 
to offshoring losers, but attractive to low-skilled workers across the board. They are either 
threatened by offshoring and free trade when they work in economically exposed occupations, 
or by labor market competition through low-skilled immigrants when they work in sheltered 
occupations (Burgoon, 2012; Dancygier & Walter 2015). This implies that low-skilled 
individuals should in general be more likely to vote for populist right parties than high-skilled 
individuals, but that there should be no reinforcing effect of offshoring exposure. Similarly, 
high-skilled voters are expected to be much less likely to vote for the populist right across the 
board for both material reasons, because they tend to benefit from cheap labor, and for 
immaterial reasons, because higher levels of education are associated with lower levels of 
xenophobia (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2006). 
Green parties, in contrast, share an emphasis on environmental protection and other 
post-materialistic issues and are both less homogenous concerning questions about welfare 
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state expansion and free market policies (Benoit & Laver, 2006). With regard to globalization, 
the issue that primarily defines the Greens’ position is “the cultural aspect of globalization 
processes” (Dolezal, 2010: 548). As ‘the’ post-materialist party family, we therefore expect 
the material interests of individuals affected by offshoring to play a negligible role in 
explaining party preferences for green parties. Rather, we expect high-skilled individuals 
across the board to be more likely to vote for these parties than low-skilled individuals. 
 
*** Table 1 about here *** 
 
Table 1 summarizes our expectations about the effect of offshoring on individual party 
preferences. As discussed, this effect should be strongest for political parties with distinct and 
polar policy positions on the social-economic dimension of party competition, that is parties 
with clear positions regarding welfare and market-liberal policies. Additionally considering 
that the salience political parties attach to economic issues varies, this also suggests that the 
effect of offshoring on voting behavior should vary among party families: offshoring 
exposure should matter more for left, liberal, and center-right parties, who serve as natural 
agents for the losers and winners of off- and onshoring. Among high-skilled individuals, job 
offshorability should increase the propensity to vote for parties located at the market-liberal 
end of the left-right divide in partisan politics, whereas this effect should be reversed among 
low-skilled individuals. These expectations also suggest that the difference in voting 
propensity should be significantly larger between low- and high-skilled individuals in 
offshorable occupations than between low- and high-skilled individuals in sheltered 
occupations. At the same time, we expect that offshoring should not be associated with 
individuals’ propensity to vote for political parties who politicize more on the cultural 
dimension of party competition, especially populist right and green parties. 
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3. Research Design 
 
We use survey data from five consecutive waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) 
conducted between 2002 and 2010 in 18 Western European countries to test the conditional 
effect of exposure to job offshorability on partisan preferences.8 This set of countries is 
especially useful because it represents developed capitalist democracies with established 
multi-party systems allowing us to test our argument about differentiated partisan effects. We 
focus on working-age respondents, because globalization-induced labor market risks should 
be most important for this section of the population.9 
 
3.1. Dependent Variables: Preference for Policy Position and Party Family 
To examine how offshoring affects voting behavior, we proceed in two steps. We first 
concentrate on the propensity to vote for parties advocating specific policies, focusing on 
parties’ overall left-right position on the economic dimension, party positions regarding 
welfare-state and positioning on market-liberal policies. In a second step, we examine how 
exposure to offshoring influences individuals’ likelihood to vote for a specific party family, 
which continue to be the most relevant element in party competition and have converged 
ideologically across Europe in the last years (Camia & Caramani, 2012).10  
																																																								
8 These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Table 2 in the 
online appendix summarizes the survey coverage. The results are robust to including countries from Eastern 
Europe (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia) and Israel. This evidence is 
consistent with our argument that, just like in developed countries, the main beneficiaries of onshoring in 
emerging markets and developing countries are high-skilled workers. 
9 We further restrict the sample size to those individuals who are in paid work or actively looking for a job and 
include retirees as robustness checks. 
10 Table 1 in the online appendix provides detailed information about the operationalization and descriptive 
statistics of all variables. 
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Our first set of dependent variables focuses on political parties’ economic policy 
positions, measured with data collected by the Comparative Manifesto Project CMP (Volkens 
et al., 2013). The CMP codes the direction and quantity of policy statements from electoral 
programs of all parties participating in a national election in a given year. Parties’ positions on 
the economic dimension are captured with the CMP score for the party’s overall orientation to 
the left or right, with higher values indicating a more rightist position. Party positions on 
welfare-state policies are measured with the respective CMP indicator and contain partisan 
positions regarding social justice (statements about social equality or the need for a fair 
distribution of resources) and welfare-state expansion (mentions of the need to maintain or 
expand social security schemes). Finally, we measure party positions regarding market-liberal 
policies with the respective CMP indicator and builds on statements about free enterprise 
capitalism (superiority of the individual enterprise over the state or favorable mentions to 
protect property rights) and economic orthodoxy (reduction of budget deficits or retrenchment 
in crises). Higher values indicate a stronger approval of the respective policies. 
To operationalize the second dependent variable, we classify national parties into cross-
nationally comparable party families based on two data sources: the dataset about the 
composition of governments in OECD-countries by Schmidt (2012) and CMP (Volkens et al., 
2013). We focus on the five party families that have been most common in Europe, have 
converged regarding their policy positions, and have increasingly homogenous voting 
distributions: left, liberal, center-right, populist right, and green parties. 11  To classify 
individual parties into these party families, we proceed as follows: First, we identify the party 
family separately on the basis of each database. We then merge these classifications in 
accordance with the following rules: If both databases report the same party family for a 
single party, we classify the latter accordingly. If one database codes a party as a member of 																																																								
11 We pool Conservatives and Christian Democrats into a ‘center-right’ category because CMP data suggests that 
there are no statistically significant differences in economic policies of both parties. Thus they hold similar 
programmatic positions on welfare-state and market-liberal policies as well as their overall left-right position.  
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one of the five party families and the other database codes it as a residual party or provides no 
information, we classify the party in line with the information-providing database. If both 
databases provide no information, we code the party family as missing. If the two databases 
disagree about the specific party family, we gather more data (e.g. the membership of a party 
in a political group in the European Parliament) to classify this party accurately.12 
We match the information about each party’s policy positions and family to ESS 
respondents based on which national party they voted for in the last national election. For 
robustness, we additionally use information about respondents’ current closeness to a political 
party. Each individual is thus assigned his or her preferred party’s policy position and 
classified as voting for one of the five party families. Whereas party policy positions are 
continuous measures, we create five dummy variables recording whether a respondent voted 
for or feels close to each party family. 
 
3.2. Independent Variables: Exposure to Offshoring and Skill-Level 
Our argument suggests that offshoring affects individual party preferences, but that this 
effect differs between low-skilled and high-skilled individuals. These considerations suggest 
three independent variables: exposure to offshoring, skill-level, and an interaction term to 
address the conditional effect. 
Exposure to offshoring: Jobs differ with regard to the degree to which they can be 
offshored. To measure respondents’ occupational offshorability, we match the information 
about respondents’ occupation contained in the ESS survey with information from an 
offshorability-index developed by Blinder (2009). This index measures whether the service 
																																																								
12 This is the case for about 2 percent of all parties. Because populist right parties are small in most countries, we 
additionally cross-check our classification with the list of right-wing populist parties provided by Mudde (2007). 
Furthermore, we code the Swiss People’s Party as a populist-right party, because country specialists point out 
that the party evolved in to a populist right party in the 1990s (Kriesi et al., 2008). Table 3 in the online appendix 
provides information concerning the categorization of both classifications.  
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the job provides can theoretically be delivered over long distances with little or no 
degradation in quality, for more than 800 occupational categories.13 It allows us to assess 
individual exposure to offshoring on an occupational basis. Because it measures the potential 
for offshoring, it connects closely with our theoretical argument about offshoring risk. 
Moreover, in a validation study, Smith and Rivkin (2008) found Blinder’s classification to be 
highly correlated with a more intuitive coding of offshorability by business school students.14 
Although Blinder distinguishes between different categories of offshorability, we use a 
dummy variable that distinguishes only between jobs that are potentially offshorable and jobs 
that cannot be offshored. Although the exact degree of offshorability for the same job may 
differ by a country, the general technical potential for offshoring, which is captured by our 
dummy variable, should be less sensitive to context. We code all jobs that do not require 
workers to be at a specific work location in their country as potentially offshorable, taking the 
value of 1. This includes workers who do not have to be physically close to their work unit, 
but also workers whose entire work unit may be moved to another country, or whose domestic 																																																								
13 The categories are based on the US Labor Department’s Standard Occupational Classification (SOC), which 
was adapted for the corresponding ISCO-codes (International Standard Classification of Occupations) available 
in the ESS (for details, see Walter and Maduz 2009). While this classification was developed for the US, we 
think it can be applied to comparable occupations in other advanced economies as well, as offshorability is 
strongly influenced by technological developments, which are not likely to differ much across developed 
countries. It is possible that job offshorability is higher in countries with widely spoken languages, especially 
English. This suggests that data from the US might over-estimate the potential offshorability of jobs in many 
European countries. However, because this should weaken the effect of job offshorability in our analyses and the 
degree of offshorability is more likely to be context-dependent than the discrete technical possibility to offshore 
this job, we think that it is reasonable to apply this index to European countries as well.  
14 We rely on Blinder’s measure because alternative measures of offshorability by Acemoglu and Autor (2011) 
and Jensen and Kletzer (2010) do not cover all occupations and/or exclude theoretically relevant job 
characteristics, such as routinization, from the construction of their indices. In addition, these measures include 
some unintuitive coding decisions, which lead us to query their suitability for our purposes. For instance, 
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) code several occupations, such as street food vendors, domestic helpers and 
cleaners, or senior officials of political party organizations that are clearly not offshorable as highly offshorable. 
Analyses using the Acemoglu and Autor measure show that results are nonetheless largely robust to using this 
alternative measure (see models 10 in the online appendix). 
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presence is not required for other reasons. All other occupations, including those not listed by 
Blinder, are coded as not offshorable.15 
Skill-level: We operationalize an individual’s skill-level based on his or her educational 
background, measured as total number of years a respondent has been in full-time education. 
Of course, individuals can also dispose of skills acquired through on-the-job-training and 
individuals with low levels of education can also deliver high-quality work, but empirical 
research has shown that higher educational achievement is positively related to higher 
occupational skills and higher levels of productivity (Jones, 2001; Spitz-Oener, 2006). 
Education years therefore serve as a proxy for individual skill-levels.16 As a robustness check, 
we additionally use information on the highest level of education a respondent has achieved. 
The answers are standardized into the ISCED-classification of education levels.17 
Interaction between offshorability and skill-level: Our argument suggests that the effect 
of offshorability on individual voting behavior depends on voters’ level of education. Figure 1 
shows the distribution of education years for respondents in non-offshorable and offshorable 
occupations. It reveals that education is similarly distributed in both groups. This underscores 
our argument that both high- and low-skilled individuals can be exposed to offshoring.  
 
*** Figure 1 about here *** 
 
To capture the expected conditional effect of exposure to offshoring and an individual’s 
skill-level on partisan preferences, we use an interaction term. Our argument makes clear 																																																								
15 Results are robust to using the ordinal and metric measure of offshorability that further differentiates the 
offshorability of occupations (Blinder, 2009). Results are also robust to recoding the offshorability dummy such 
that the offshorable dummy contains only occupations in Blinder’s two highest offshorability categories. 
16 Education years are capped at a maximum of 25 years. 
17 Because of data limitations in the ESS and a highly asymmetrical distribution (especially ISCED categories 3 
and 4), we converted the 7-point ISCED-classification into a 4-point scale ranging from less than lower 
secondary to completed tertiary education by combining several categories (see table 4 in the online appendix). 
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predictions about the nature of this interaction term. Since offshoring creates more labor 
market risks for low-skilled individuals, this group of voters should be particularly likely to 
vote for parties that champion leftist and pro-welfare policies, and less likely to vote for those 
with a market-liberal policy profile. In contrast, highly skilled exposed individuals should 
prefer parties on the right of the economic policy dimension, who favor market-friendly 
policies. This suggests a positive and statistically significant interaction term for the analyses 
of voting for the left-right policy dimension, parties’ stances on the market economy, liberal 
and center-right parties. In contrast, we expect a negative and statistically significant 
interaction term for welfare policy positions and voting for left parties. Finally, we do not 
expect a statistically significant interaction term for populist right or green parties.18  
 
3.3. Control Variables 
We consider a number of variables that control for alternative explanations of individual 
voting behavior. Following our theoretical argument, the selection of observable confounders 
bears on a risk-based model of voting behavior (Hellwig, 2008; Mughan et al., 2003; Mughan 
& Lacy, 2002). We include respondent’s income, gender, age, whether he or she is 
unemployed, lives in an urban area, and cultural attitudes toward immigration in our preferred 
specification. Respondent’s income is measured by a self-classification into one of twelve 
income classes. To provide cross-national comparability we recode this variable so that it 
represents the deviation of the respondent’s income-class from the country-specific median 
income-class. We include age in years and a squared age term. Cultural attitudes toward 
immigration are measured on an 11-point scale, where higher values indicate that ‘cultural life 
																																																								
18 The interaction term also allows us to address the ‘learning to love globalization’ argument that education 
correlates strongly with cosmopolitan attitudes (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2006). If these attitudes were the 
overriding determinant of individuals’ electoral choices, we should not observe any differences among exposed 
and sheltered individuals with the same level of education. 
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is undermined’ by people from other countries.19 The remaining variables are coded as 
dummy variables. Furthermore, we estimate an enhanced specification controlling for 
additional variables related to labor market risk, such as outsider status (Emmenegger et al., 
2012; Rueda, 2005), skill specificity (Iversen & Soskice, 2001),20 or routinization (Acemoglu 
& Autor, 2011). In additional robustness checks we also control for self-employment, labor 
union membership, political interest, church attendance, economic attitudes toward 
immigration, ideology using self-placement on a 10-point left-right scale, employment in the 
public sector, sectoral exposure to international trade21 and a proxy for risk aversion.22 
On the macro-level, we control for different national contexts in which respondents take 
their voting decision. The unemployment rate is a proxy for the state of the economy. The 
stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) captures the country’s overall exposure to the 
globalization of production. Both variables proxy the general level of labor market risks 
(Arzheimer, 2009; Hellwig & Samuels, 2007; Kayser, 2007). In addition, we include the 
effective number of electoral parties to account for the fact that vote shares vary with the 
number of parties competing in an election (Bormann & Golder, 2013). Results are also 
robust to controlling for the country’s trade openness and the level of social expenditure.  
 
3.4. Method 
																																																								
19 This variable allows us to directly address the ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ argument put forward by Mansfield and Mutz 
(2013). If xenophobic values were the only driving factor, we should not see any remaining differences with 
regard to offshorability and skill-level. 
20 Skill specificity captures the degree to which a job requires specialized skills, in contrast to general skills. 
High skill specificity implies that outside options are considerably lower, because a worker might not be able to 
transfer his or her skill set to another job. Data are taken from Rehm (2009). 
21 This is a continuous variable measured as the sum of imports and exports, standardized by gross output for 
each sector in each survey wave. 
22 There is no question that measures risk aversion directly. We thus use a proxy that asks whether respondents 
generally plan for the future or take each day as it comes, which is however only included in the 2006 survey. 
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We perform our analyses on a dataset containing roughly 53000 respondents in 18 
countries at 5 points in time. Our preferred model specification is a multilevel model, where 
individuals (level 1) are nested within countries (level 2). This model allows us to account for 
the fact that respondents from the same country share a common context and are, thus, not 
necessarily independent from each other (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008; Steenbergen & 
Jones, 2002). To control for temporal variation, we include dummies for survey waves in all 
model specifications.23 To analyze party position preferences, we rely on fixed effects OLS 
specifications. Concerning preferences for party families, we employ random effects probit 
specifications. The disadvantage in modeling party preferences separately for all party 
families is that it does not allow to model simultaneous choice. As a robustness check, we 
therefore also use a multinomial logit model with country dummies (Long & Freese, 2006). 
 
 
4. Empirical Findings 
 
Does offshoring affect partisan politics through individuals’ electoral preferences? As 
we will show in detail below, our analyses of the effects of offshoring on voters’ preferences 
for partisan policy positions and party families indicate that job offshorability is indeed 
associated with variation in the voting behavior of individuals and that this effect is 
conditional on skill-levels. As predicted by our argument, voters take their offshoring-related 
material interests into account when making electoral choices: Offshoring losers vote for 
different political parties than offshoring winners. Importantly, this is only the case for party 
families that strongly advocate economic and social policies targeted towards compensating 
the losers or benefitting the winners of offshoring: left, liberal, and center-right parties. In 
																																																								
23 Results are robust to using models that cluster respondents in country-surveys instead of countries.  
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contrast, voting for populist right and green parties does not differ among individuals in 
offshorable and sheltered occupations. Offshoring thus does not affect all parties equally. 
 
4.1. Offshoring and Preferences for Partisan Policy Positions 
How does exposure to offshoring affect individuals’ preference for specific party 
positions? Table 2 presents regression results for our analysis of individual preferences for 
parties’ general left-right position, their position regarding welfare-state policies and their 
position regarding market-liberal policies.  
 
*** Table 2 about here *** 
 
As predicted by our argument, low-skilled individuals working in offshorable 
occupations are less likely to vote for parties to the right of the political spectrum than low-
skilled individuals in sheltered occupations (column 1). The positive and statistically 
significant interaction term between education years and offshorability, illustrated in figure 
2A, indicates, however, that this relationship changes with higher levels of education. Among 
individuals who have received at least 11 years of schooling, those in offshorable jobs are 
more inclined to vote for more rightist parties at a statistically significant level, and this effect 
further increases the more education a voter has received.  
Turning to more specific partisan positions on welfare-state expansion and market-
liberal policies, we find the same pattern. Exposure to offshoring increases individuals’ 
probability to vote for parties advocating a strong welfare state when they are poorly 
educated, but decreases this probability when they are highly educated (column 2). In 
contrast, among the high-skilled, those working in offshorable occupations are significantly 
more likely to vote for parties with market-liberal policy positions than high-skilled workers 
sheltered from global competition, whereas exposure to offshoring significantly reduces this 
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likelihood among the low-skilled (column 3). In both cases, education reverses the 
relationship between offshorability and preferences for welfare-state and market-liberal 
policies respectively (figures 2B and 2C). 
 
*** Figure 2 about here *** 
 
Interestingly, the policy preferences of individuals in sheltered occupations appear to be 
at odds with the conventional wisdom of traditional partisan models. Among individuals in 
non-offshorable occupations, higher levels of education are associated with partisan 
preferences for more leftist parties and less market liberal policies and are not related to 
parties’ stance on welfare-state policies. This finding might reflect the fact that high-skilled 
individuals sheltered from offshoring are those that provide many of the services an advanced 
welfare state offers and echoes the argument that many left parties opened up for new, left-
libertarian voter groups in the late 20th century (Kitschelt, 1988). Importantly, this finding 
also suggests that offshoring, as a direct exposure to the global economy, creates a cleavage in 
party preferences between individuals exposed to this form of globalization and those 
sheltered from it that goes beyond education. 
The results for the control variables are in line with our expectations. On the micro-
level, we find that poorer, female, and older respondents, those living in urban areas, and the 
unemployed are more likely to vote for welfare-state supporting parties and less likely to vote 
for parties advocating market-liberal policies. Immigration skeptics are less inclined to prefer 
parties explicitly proposing welfare-state extension. On the macro-level, support for rightist 
and market-liberal parties tends to be higher in countries with higher unemployment rates, 
higher levels of FDI, and a higher number of electoral parties. 
Our results are robust to a variety of modifications, all documented in the online 
appendix. One objection to our analyses is that offshorability is highly correlated with other 
 24 
forms of labor market risk. The most prominent candidate here is routinization, because 
workers with routine jobs are most likely to lose their jobs in a deindustrializing world, and 
routine jobs could also be the ones that can most easily be offshored. Including routinization 
as a control variable does not change our results for offshorability, however. Furthermore, 
skill specificity of an individual’s occupation and whether she is a labor market outsider also 
do not alter the effect of offshorability (see table A1). Another objection is that the effect of 
offshoring might capture unobserved factors that underlie respondents’ occupational choice in 
a way that sorts them into offshorable and non-offshorable jobs. An obvious candidate here is 
risk aversion: Offshorable jobs are much more likely to be private sector jobs that offer large 
rewards but also large risks. It is thus possible that more risk averse voters choose safer jobs 
(say, as a teacher or nurse) than more risk-taking individuals. Unfortunately, the ESS surveys 
do not contain any questions that allow us to directly assess voters’ level of risk aversion. We 
therefore rely on two proxies. The first one is a dummy for public sector employment, which 
tends to be much less risky than private-sector employment. The second proxy is respondents 
answer to the question whether they generally plan for the future or take each day as it comes, 
assuming that those who plan for the future are more risk averse than those who live by the 
day. Unfortunately, this question is only included in the 2006 survey, so that our sample is 
substantially reduced. Moreover, we also control for the respondents’ ideological self-
placement on the left-right scale. This is not our preferred specification because we believe 
that the ideological self-placement captures part of what we want to explain in the first place. 
The self-placement on the general left-right dimension should, however, be correlated with 
potential unobserved confounders that might drive our effects of offshorability. Our results 
are unchanged when we include these proxies, increasing our confidence that offshorability in 
and of itself does affect voters’ party choice. In addition, our results are robust to restricting 
the sample to active labor market participants, expanding the sample to all retired and non-
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retired respondents, or including Eastern European countries.24 Using alternative coding of 
skills and offshorability and including more micro- and macro-level controls similarly does 
not change the conclusions we draw with regard to the conditional effect of offshoring.  
Summing up, our results show that the gap in partisan preferences between low- and 
high-skilled individuals is larger among those working in offshorable occupations than among 
those individuals sheltered from the offshoring trend. Moreover, this gap opens up in the 
expected directions: among the high-skilled, those benefitting from offshoring show a 
stronger preference for parties with neoliberal policy positions than those in sheltered 
occupations, whereas those most threatened by offshoring (low-skilled workers in offshorable 
jobs) most strongly prefer parties advocating a generous welfare state. 
 
4.2. Offshoring and Preferences for Party Families 
In a next step, we turn to individuals’ voting preference for specific party families. We 
focus on the five most common party families and expect that offshoring affects voters’ 
behavior for parties with a clear and vocal position on the economic dimension (left, liberal, 
and conservative parties), but to play a negligible role in explaining voters’ propensity to vote 
for parties who predominantly focus on non-economic issues (populist right and green 
parties). Table 3 presents the results of five multi-level probit regressions. 
 
*** Table 3 about here *** 
 
As expected, working in a potentially offshorable job significantly increases voters’ 
tendency to vote for a leftist party and decreases the likelihood of voting for a liberal or 																																																								
24 Moreover, offshorability increases turnout for voters at all skill levels (see table 47 in the online appendix), 
which is in line with our argument. Individuals that are affected by offshoring (both positively and negatively) 
show stronger preferences for distinct policies. Assuming that a higher demand for specific policies results in a 
higher probability to turn out, we would expect that both winners and losers vote, albeit for different parties. 
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center-right party among the low-skilled, although this effect is not statistically significant. 
The sizeable and statistically significant interaction terms between job offshorability and 
education years for all of these parties demonstrate, however, that exposure to offshoring 
affects voting behavior, and does so especially among the high-skilled. Figure 3 plots the 
marginal effects of offshorability on party preferences at different skill levels.25 In case of left 
parties (figure 3A), working in a potentially offshorable occupation significantly increases the 
likelihood of a vote for everyone who enjoyed less than eight years of full-time education. In 
contrast, respondents with twelve years of education and more are significantly less likely to 
vote for a left party when they work in an offshorable occupation. This shows that low-skilled 
individuals exposed to offshoring risks are particularly likely to vote for the traditional 
advocates of welfare state expansion and redistribution, whereas high-skilled individuals in 
offshorable jobs are least likely to vote for these parties.  
Our argument suggests that this latter group should instead vote for liberal or center-
right parties and our results support this claim. Figure 3B shows that offshorability 
significantly increases the propensity to vote for a liberal party for all individuals with at least 
eleven years of education. Somewhat unexpectedly, offshorability does not have a direct 
effect on liberal party preferences among the low skilled, possibly reflecting the fact that 
these parties are unattractive to less privileged voters in general. We find similar effects for 
center-right parties. Job offshorability has a negative, though insignificant effect on the voting 
propensity of low-skilled individuals for centrist parties (figure 3C). As for the liberal parties, 
offshoring has a statistically significant effect on the voting behavior of those individuals with 
at least eleven years of education. Among this group, offshoring increases the propensity to 
vote for center-right parties, and this effect gets larger the more years of full-time education 
an individual has received. 																																																								
25 We interpret the effect of the interaction term via marginal effects plots because both size and statistical 
significance of the estimated coefficient can vary in case of non-linear models (Ai & Norton, 2003). 
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*** Figure 3 about here *** 
 
The main prediction of our argument is that exposure to offshoring increases the vote 
gap between low- and high-skilled individuals’ for these three party families. To analyze the 
change in vote gaps, we calculate the first difference in predicted probabilities between high- 
and low-skilled respondents for those in occupations sheltered from and those in occupations 
exposed to offshoring, holding all other variables at their median.26 We then use this 
information to calculate the percentage increase (or decrease) in the vote gap between these 
groups. Table 4 presents the results. For left parties, the difference in predicted probabilities 
between low- and high-skilled respondents working in non-offshorable occupations is 7.75 
percentage points. In contrast, this difference amounts to 14.42 percentage points if voters are 
exposed to offshoring. Exposure to offshoring thus almost doubles the vote gap between high- 
and low-skilled voters and this difference in vote gaps is statistically significant. We observe 
similar effects for liberal and center-right parties. Concerning the former, the vote gap 
between low- and high-skilled respondents is 1.20 percentage points among those in sheltered 
occupations and 2.09 percentage points among respondents in exposed occupations, a sizeable 
74% increase. The same is true concerning center-right parties. Among those in sheltered 
jobs, high-skilled voters are more likely to vote for the conservatives than low-skilled voters, 
leading to a difference in voting propensities of 1.79 percentage points. Among those in 
offshorable jobs, the vote gap between high-skilled and low-skilled voters more than triples 
amounting to a difference in voting probabilities of 5.41 percentage points. Taken together, 
this suggests that job offshorability amplifies the difference in voting probabilities for center-
right parties between low- and high-skilled individuals by 3.63 percentage points. Given that 
																																																								
26 We use 8 and 20 education years, because they represent the 5th and 95th percentile in our sample. 
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a multitude of factors influence individual voting behavior and people do not switch votes 
often, the effect of offshoring is thus comparatively large.  
 
*** Table 4 about here *** 
 
In contrast to the three party families examined so far, we do not expect systematic 
differences related to offshoring for those parties with a strong focus on non-economic issue. 
The results presented in columns 4 and 5 in table 3 support these expectations. Whereas the 
educational background has indeed a strong and statistically significantly effect on 
individuals’ voting preference for these parties – education is negatively correlated with party 
preferences for the populist right and positively with those for green parties – exposure to 
offshoring has no such effect. For both party families, skill-level also does not affect the 
strong relationship between offshorability and electoral preferences, evidenced by the small 
and statistically insignificant interaction terms. Figures 3D and 3E further demonstrate that 
offshorability has no consistent statistically significant conditional effect on voting propensity 
irrespective of education. As a result, the vote gap between high- and low-skilled individuals 
is almost identical for individuals working in non-offshorable occupations and those working 
in offshorable occupations (see table 4). All in all, our findings show that offshoring does not 
increase the popularity of populist right and green parties. Rather, green parties attract high-
skilled and populist right parties appeal to low-skilled voters across the board. Especially with 
regard to the populist right, this suggest that voters’ subjective feeling of being threatened by 
globalization (see de Vries and Hoffmann, 2016) may not necessarily reflect objective risks 
associated with offshoring. 
Concerning the control variables, women and respondents living in urban areas are 
more likely to vote for the left and for green parties. Left parties and the populist right are 
particularly likely to attract votes from the unemployed. And liberal and center-right parties 
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are more likely to attract high-income voters, whereas poorer respondents are more likely to 
vote for the left, the populist right, and the Greens. Unsurprisingly, populist right and center-
right parties are attractive to respondents who are sensitive towards immigration on cultural 
grounds. Higher overall unemployment rates strengthen electoral support for parties of the left 
but depress the vote for liberal parties. The same holds for a country’s exposure to FDI. 
Interestingly, FDI seems to dampen the prospects of populist right and green parties. 
Again, our results are generally robust to several robustness checks. The offshoring 
effect remains robust to the inclusion of other sources of labor market risk (see table A2) and 
generally robust to including the risk aversion proxies public sector job and planning-
propensity. Similarly, altering the sample size or including more control variables does not 
change this picture. Only in case of the liberal party family are the results sensitive to some 
model specifications. Furthermore, the interaction term loses its statistical significance both 
for the liberal and center-right parties if we include ideology. Results are also robust to 
modeling the simultaneous electoral choice among alternative party families using a 
multilevel multinomial model (see table 6 in the online appendix).  
Overall, these results provide strong support that offshoring has a significant demand-
side effect for those political parties with a clear and salient position regarding economic 
policies of specific relevance with regard to the material effects of offshoring. This effect is 
particularly sizeable for leftist and center-right parties, and prominent but slightly more 
sensitive to alternative specifications for the liberal parties. Nevertheless, our findings show 
that offshoring shapes individual voting behavior – but only for some parties. Offshoring does 
not play an important role in voters’ calculus in case of populist right or green parties, who 
privilege non-economic issues in their partisan agendas. This reinforces the argument that it is 
important to take seriously the fact that parties compete in multi-party systems; for some of 
which, but not for all, the globalization of production is likely to have electoral consequences. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Offshoring has become widespread in developed economies and has turned into an 
increasingly salient topic in public debates. What are the political consequences of this 
development? Our paper has investigated this question with regard to electoral and partisan 
politics in multi-party systems. We argue and show that the material consequences of 
offshoring affect voters’ party preferences. However, this effect is far from being uniform: 
Not only is exposure to offshoring associated with significant differences in party preferences 
among high- and low-skilled individuals, it seriously affects the electoral success of some 
parties; especially those that cater to the material needs of offshoring winners and losers and, 
at the same time, put high saliency on these issues. 
We argue that this variation is explained by two important insights: First, offshoring 
creates both winners and losers. The individual-level material consequences of offshoring 
vary significantly among individuals based on their skill-level: high-skilled individuals in 
offshorable jobs benefit from the opportunities of offshoring and low-skilled individuals with 
offshorable jobs increasingly face labor market risks. This translates into variation in party 
preferences. Second, especially in multi-party systems, political parties differ in their policy 
positions and the salience they attach to them. This means that some parties pursue policies 
that are particularly relevant for individuals affected, positively or negatively, by offshoring, 
whereas other parties emphasize policy fields for which offshoring only plays a minor role. 
Taken together, this suggests that offshoring affects the voting behavior of some 
individuals (those exposed to offshoring) for some parties (those with a strong focus on socio-
economic policy issues), but has no effect on others. Our analyses of the determinants of 
individual electoral preferences for policy positions and party families in 18 European 
countries confirm this hypothesis. Political parties advocating income redistribution and a 
strong welfare state (left parties) are particularly attractive to low-skilled individuals working 
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in offshorable occupations. In contrast, parties with a more market-liberal policy profile 
(liberal and center-right parties) attract the beneficiaries of offshoring, namely high-skilled 
individuals in offshorable occupations. Finally, as parties emphasizing policies unrelated to 
the globalization of production, offshoring does not affect the electoral fortunes of populist 
right and green parties. 
Our study speaks to two ongoing debates about the effects of globalization on domestic 
politics: First, the debate about the influence of globalization on voting behavior in general 
(for a summary, see Kayser, 2007). Several authors have argued that globalization reduces the 
importance of economic issues on vote choice (Hellwig & Samuels, 2007; Steiner & Martin, 
2012). While this may be true in the aggregate, our results suggest that there is much more 
nuance in individual voting behavior. Globalization does not affect all voters in a uniform 
manner, but its consequences vary widely within the electorate. Moreover, by showing that 
these material consequences matter for voting decisions, our analysis challenges studies 
claiming that individual voting behavior and policy preferences are influenced mostly by non-
material issues rather than voters’ material self-interest related to globalization (Hellwig, 
2008; Hellwig & Samuels, 2007; Mansfield & Mutz, 2013).  
Second, our paper contributes to the debate about the influence of globalization on party 
competition. A large literature shows that globalization affects partisan politics in developed 
countries (Ezrow & Hellwig, 2014; Garrett, 1998; Haupt, 2010; Kriesi et al., 2008; Swank, 
2002). Nonetheless, researchers have lamented the lack of attention to how the effects of 
globalization on public opinion affect party competition indirectly (Ward et al., 2011) and 
have emphasized the need for further research on globalization’s impact on political parties, 
particularly on parties of the center and right (Adams et al., 2009). Our analysis shows that 
the impact of offshoring varies strongly across party families. Rather than voting in favor or 
against incumbents when exposed to globalization, voters consciously choose parties that 
cater towards their needs. Our findings are thus particularly relevant for the majority of 
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countries characterized by multi-party systems. Importantly, our analysis shows that the 
objective material consequences of offshoring are not a salient issue for one party family that 
has been frequently characterized as catering to globalization losers – the populist right 
(Kriesi et al., 2008; Mughan et al., 2003). In contrast, we find that these parties appeal to low-
skilled workers in general, irrespective of whether they work in occupations exposed to or 
sheltered from offshoring. Although voters of these parties report that they feel threatened by 
globalization (de Vries & Hoffmann 2016), this suggests that policies limiting the 
globalization of production may not necessarily alleviate these voters’ problems. Leftist, 
liberal, and center-right parties advocate policies that specifically benefit the losers and 
winners from offshoring, but not necessarily those affected by other forms of globalization. 
For these parties, we observe a distinct effect of offshoring as a specific type of globalization.  
Overall, our findings underline the importance of distinguishing between specific types 
of globalization, their specific individual-level effects and different types of parties. When 
this is taken into account, offshoring has clear and identifiable effects on voters’ electoral 
preferences and on party politics more generally. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Education Years by Offshorability 
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Figure 2: Conditional Effect of Offshorability on Voting for Policy Positions 
 
Notes: Marginal effects of offshorability on policy positions (figure 2) and party families (figure 3) are based on 
models reported in table 2 and 3. Graphs are created with code developed by Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006).  
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Figure 3: Conditional Effect of Offshorability on Voting for Party Families 
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Table 1: Expected Effect of Offshorability on Party Preferences 
 
 Low-skilled 
individuals 
High-skilled 
individuals 
Left-Right Position – + 
Welfare-State Policies + – 
Market-Liberal Policies – + 
Left Parties + – 
Liberal Parties – + 
Center-Right Parties – + 
Populist Right Parties 0 0 
Green Parties 0 0 
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Table 2: Determinants of Individual Preferences for Policy Positions 
 
 
Overall left-
right scale 
Welfare-state 
policies 
Market-liberal 
policies 
Education years -0.104*** -0.005 -0.029*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)    
Offshorability -1.608*** 0.428** -0.273**  
 (0.57) (0.19) (0.12)    
Education x Offshorability 0.181*** -0.045*** 0.035*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)    
Income 0.509*** -0.159*** 0.085*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)    
Female -1.710*** 0.401*** -0.310*** 
 (0.15) (0.05) (0.03)    
Age in years -0.235*** 0.074*** -0.039*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)    
Age squared 0.002*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Unemployed -1.509*** 0.436*** -0.273*** 
 (0.33) (0.11) (0.07)    
Urban resident -1.430*** 0.344*** -0.202*** 
 (0.16) (0.06) (0.04)    
Anti-immigration (culture) 1.308*** -0.262*** 0.204*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)    
Unemployment rate -0.043 -0.359*** 0.111*** 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.01)    
FDI stock 0.070*** -0.013*** 0.004*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Effective number of parties 0.477** -1.717*** 0.865*** 
 (0.20) (0.07) (0.04)    
# of respondents 46075 46075 46075 
# of countries 18 18 18 
ICC (rho) 0.237 0.514 0.211 
Panel SD (sigma) 8.868 5.528 1.777 
R2 (overall) 0.067 0.001 0.017 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Multilevel OLS estimates, standard errors in parentheses. 
Level of statistical significance: * p≤0.10; ** p≤0.05; *** p≤0.01. 
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Table 3: Determinants of Individual Preferences for Party Families 
 
 
Left Liberal Center-Right Populist Right Green 
Education years -0.017*** 0.019*** 0.004* -0.049*** 0.049*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Offshorability 0.159*** -0.052 -0.051 -0.018 -0.013    
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08)    
Education x Offshorability -0.015*** 0.009** 0.008** -0.002 -0.003    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)    
Income -0.033*** 0.040*** 0.042*** -0.023*** -0.045*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)    
Female 0.054*** -0.053*** -0.030** -0.214*** 0.216*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)    
Age in years 0.029*** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.004 0.008    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)    
Age squared -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Unemployed 0.138*** -0.131*** -0.151*** 0.132*** 0.018    
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)    
Urban resident 0.102*** -0.014 -0.187*** -0.017 0.221*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)    
Anti-immigration (culture) -0.060*** -0.004 0.048*** 0.175*** -0.127*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)    
Unemployment rate 0.021*** -0.056*** -0.010** -0.011 -0.002    
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)    
FDI stock 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001**  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Effective number of parties -0.102*** -0.012 0.014 0.069*** 0.107*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)    
# of respondents 52629 52629 52629 52629 52629 
# of countries 18 18 18 18 18 
ICC (rho) 0.085 0.629 0.148 0.534 0.676 
Panel SD (sigma) 0.305 1.303 0.416 1.069 1.444 
R2 (McKelvey/Zavoina) 0.063 0.023 0.045 0.123 0.083 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BIC 66685.14 31539.77 61652.81 17296.23 22420.72 
Log-likelihood -33239.30 -15666.61 -30723.13 -8544.84 -11107.08 
Multilevel probit estimates, standard errors in parentheses. 
Level of statistical significance: * p≤0.10; ** p≤0.05; *** p≤0.01. 
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Table 4: Substantial Effect of Offshorability 
 
 
(I) 
Difference in voting 
probability between 
low- and high-skilled 
respondents in  
non-offshorable jobs 
(II) 
Difference in voting 
probability between 
low- and high-skilled 
individuals in  
offshorable jobs 
(III) 
= (II – I) 
Change in voting 
probability between 
low- and high-skilled 
due to offshorability 
(IV) 
Change in voting 
probability between 
low- and high-skilled 
due to offshorability 
in percent 
Left 7.75 14.42 6.67*** 86.12 
Liberal -1.20 -2.09 -0.89 74.36 
Center-Right -1.79 -5.41 -3.63** 203.06 
Populist Right 1.19 1.11 -0.07 6.18 
Green -1.49 -1.20 0.29 19.50 
Predicted probabilities are based on models reported in table 3; control variables held at their mean. 
Low-skilled individuals have 8 (5th percentile), high-skilled individuals 20 (95th percentile) education years. A 
positive difference implies that low-skilled individuals are more likely to vote for the respective party family. 
Level of statistical significance: * p≤0.10; ** p≤0.05; *** p≤0.01. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Determinants of Individual Preferences for Policy Positions – Robustness 
 
 
Overall left-
right scale 
Welfare-state 
policies 
Market-liberal 
policies 
Education years -0.084*** -0.012 -0.024*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)    
Offshorability -1.219** 0.201 -0.171    
 (0.62) (0.21) (0.13)    
Education x Offshorability 0.149*** -0.033** 0.030*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)    
Income 0.470*** -0.149*** 0.078*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)    
Female -1.909*** 0.454*** -0.343*** 
 (0.17) (0.06) (0.04)    
Age in years -0.261*** 0.085*** -0.043*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)    
Age squared 0.003*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Unemployed -1.134*** 0.341*** -0.208*** 
 (0.37) (0.13) (0.08)    
Urban resident -1.464*** 0.365*** -0.196*** 
 (0.18) (0.06) (0.04)    
Anti-immigration (culture) 1.327*** -0.267*** 0.204*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)    
Routinization -0.106 -0.350*** 0.107*** 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.01)    
Skill specificity 0.073*** -0.013*** 0.005*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Outsider 0.319 -1.835*** 0.799*** 
 (0.23) -0.08 -0.050 
Unemployment rate -0.064 0.049 -0.002    
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.02)    
FDI stock -0.492*** 0.062 -0.082**  
 (0.15) (0.05) (0.03)    
Effective number of parties -0.949*** 0.192** -0.166*** 
 (0.27) (0.09) (0.06)    
# of respondents 38013 38013 38013 
# of countries 18 18 18 
ICC (rho) 0.240 0.524 0.203 
Panel SD (sigma) 8.953 5.674 1.738 
R2 (overall) 0.069 0.002 0.019 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Multilevel OLS estimates, standard errors in parentheses. 
Level of statistical significance: * p≤0.10; ** p≤0.05; *** p≤0.01. 
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Table A2: Determinants of Individual Preferences for Party Families – Robustness 
 
 
Left Liberal Center-Right Populist Right Green 
Education years -0.012*** 0.014*** -0.001 -0.033*** 0.047*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Offshorability 0.118** -0.048 -0.030 0.005 0.030    
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)    
Education x Offshorability -0.014*** 0.011** 0.007** -0.008 -0.005    
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)    
Income -0.027*** 0.032*** 0.039*** -0.020*** -0.044*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)    
Female 0.079*** -0.075*** -0.047*** -0.221*** 0.212*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)    
Age in years 0.031*** -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.003 0.011*   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)    
Age squared -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Unemployed 0.099*** -0.121** -0.105*** 0.090* 0.012    
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)    
Urban resident 0.107*** -0.025 -0.191*** 0.003 0.225*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)    
Anti-immigration 
(cultural) -0.064*** 0.000 0.050*** 0.170*** -0.123*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)    
Routinization 0.061*** -0.019* -0.046*** 0.086*** -0.051*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Skill specificity 0.074*** -0.088*** -0.087*** 0.078*** 0.001    
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)    
Outsider 0.032 -0.007 -0.090*** -0.030 0.130*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)    
Unemployment rate 0.023*** -0.054*** -0.012** -0.023 -0.005    
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)    
FDI stock 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Effective number of parties -0.104*** -0.014 0.021 0.061** 0.120*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)    
# of respondents 43627 43627 43627 43627 43627 
# of countries 18 18 18 18 18 
ICC (rho) 0.086 0.629 0.155 0.540 0.655 
Panel SD (sigma) 0.308 1.301 0.429 1.083 1.379 
R2 (McKelvey/Zavoina) 0.076 0.025 0.056 0.126 0.091 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BIC 54938.18 25162.28 51092.85 14219.11 18495.32 
Log-likelihood -27351.57 -12463.62 -25428.91 -6992.04 -9130.14 
Multilevel probit estimates, standard errors in parentheses. 
Level of statistical significance: * p≤0.10; ** p≤0.05; *** p≤0.01. 
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